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STANDING IN THE WAY OF PARENTAL 
RIGHTS—THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT 
RESOLVES COURTS OF APPEALS SPLIT IN 
FAVOR OF NONPARENTS 
Madison Bertrand* 
In In re H.S., the Supreme Court of Texas held that a nonparent has standing 
to pursue a suit affecting the parent-child relationship (SAPCR) even when the 
child’s parents have not wholly relinquished their parental rights and 
responsibilities.1 In its holding, the court declared that granting nonparent 
standing under Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9) “to persons ‘who have played 
an unusual and significant parent-like role in a child’s life’ . . . does not 
unconstitutionally interfere with parents’ fundamental liberty interest in raising 
their children.”2 The court decided to use the statutory interpretation of § 
102.003(a)(9) outlined in Jasek v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services3 
to reach its holding in In re H.S.4 In favor of the Jasek interpretation, the court 
used its authority to resolve the split among the Texas courts of appeals by 
discounting the valid arguments of particular courts of appeals, as well as by 
emphasizing the United States Supreme Court’s recognition of the “fundamental 
right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of 
their children.”5 The court erred in its holding because the fundamental right of 
parents requires a parent to relinquish their parental rights under § 102.003(a)(9) 
before a nonparent may assert standing. 
Section 102.003(a)(9), entitled “General Standing to File Suit,” confers 
standing to file a SAPCR on a “person, other than a foster parent, who had actual 
care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months.”6 Disputes 
surrounding the interpretation of this statute generally hinge on what is required 
 
 * Managing Editor, SMU Law Review. Candidate for J.D. 2020, SMU Dedman School of 
Law; B.S. 2014, Brigham Young University.  
 1. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 163 (Tex. 2018). 
 2. Id. (citation omitted). 
 3. See 348 S.W.3d 523, 535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.). 
 4. 550 S.W.3d at 157. 
 5. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 6. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 102.003(a)(9). 
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to have “actual control.” This was the central issue in In re H.S.7 
I.  BACKGROUND 
For the first twenty-three months of her life, Heather8 lived in the home of her 
maternal grandmother and step-grandfather (Grandparents).9 Heather’s mother 
(Mother) and father (Father) were Heather’s “joint managing conservators,”10 
meaning both Mother and Father shared joint custody11—specifically, 
responsibility and authority—of Heather. Mother, who was not married to Father, 
periodically resided with Heather at Grandparents’ home until she moved into a 
sober-living facility to treat her alcohol addiction.12 At that time, the parties 
unanimously agreed that Heather would continue to live with Grandparents while 
Mother remained in the facility.13 Mother was in the facility for six months, 
during which Grandparents served as Heather’s “primary caregivers” and thus 
“directed [her] day-to-day activities and took care of her daily needs; provided her 
with a home, food, clothing, and shelter; . . . paid for her daycare,” and addressed 
her medical needs.14 During this time, Mother and Father remained involved in 
Heather’s life: Mother saw Heather regularly, often assisting with Heather’s 
nightly routine, and Heather stayed with Father about every other weekend.15 
Mother and Father also made medical decisions for Heather, authorizing doctors’ 
visits and medical treatments.16 Ultimately, “Grandparents kept Mother and 
Father informed about Heather’s daily activities and medical needs and ‘sought 
input’ from them on decisions that needed to be made about her.”17 
Eventually, Grandparents filed a SAPCR, requesting appointment as Heather’s 
managing conservators and alleging they had standing to sue as nonparents under 
§ 102.003(a)(9).18 In response, Father filed a plea seeking to dismiss 
Grandparents’ petition for lack of standing, arguing that Grandparents did not 
have the statutorily required “actual control” of Heather because Mother and 
Father “intended the arrangement with Grandparents to be temporary . . . [and] 
did not intend to relinquish . . . control of Heather to Grandparents.”19 The trial 
court granted Father’s plea and dismissed Grandparents’ petition, finding that 
Grandparents did not establish the statutorily required actual control over 
Heather.20 The court of appeals affirmed, holding 
 
 7. 550 S.W.3d at 156. 
 8. “Heather” is the pseudonym the courts used to refer to the child at issue. Id. at 152 n.1. 
 9. Id. at 152–53. 
 10. Id. at 153. 
 11. See id.; see also TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.016 (defining “joint managing conservatorship”). 
 12. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 153. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted in first quotation). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 153−54. 
 17. Id. at 154. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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[S]tanding under section 102.003(a)(9) cannot be gained by a nonparent 
exercising care, control, and possession over a child in the absence of 
evidence that the child’s parent is unfit or has abdicated his or her own care, 
control, and possession over the child to the nonparent for the statutory 
period.21 
The Texas Supreme Court granted the petition for review.22 
II.  THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S ANALYSIS 
Upon review, the Texas Supreme Court applied the statutory interpretation 
used in Jasek to declare that Grandparents had standing and remanded the case 
to the trial court on the merits.23 The Jasek Court concluded that a nonparent has 
actual control under § 102.003(a)(9) when they “exercise . . . guidance, governance 
and direction similar to that typically exercised on by parents with their 
children,”24 regardless of the status of the parents’ rights.25 In adopting this 
interpretation, the Texas Supreme Court stated that such a holding establishes a 
“high” and “narrow” threshold for nonparent standing in Texas26 that recognizes 
the fundamental but conditional rights of parents.27 In finding actual control in 
nonparents who “play[] an unusual and significant parent-like role in a child’s 
life,” the court dismissed any requirement that parents relinquish their own 
parental rights, including legal authority, before nonparent standing may be 
established.28 
To reach its holding, the court first had to determine the plain meaning of 
actual control. In doing so, the court applied statutory interpretation principles, 
presuming the legislature meant for each word of the statute to have an individual 
and purposeful meaning.29 In deciding the plain meaning of actual control,30 the 
court first addressed the issue of whether the statute required nonparents to have 
legal authority over the child. In an attempt to avoid too narrow of an 
interpretation, the court determined that the ordinary meaning of actual control 
was explicitly separate from “legal control” or “any other language indicating that 
 
 21. In re H.S., 552 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016) (mem. op.), rev’d, 550 
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018). 
 22. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 154. 
 23. Id. at 163. 
 24. Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 533 (Tex. App.—Austin 
2011, no pet.) (citing Coons-Andersen v. Andersen, 104 S.W.3d 630, 636 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, 
no pet.)). 
 25. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 160. 
 26. Compare id. at 163, with Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (plurality opinion) 
(holding a visitation statute permitting “[a]ny person” to petition for visitation rights “at any time” 
unconstitutional). 
 27. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 163. 
 28. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 845 A.2d 1146, 1149 
(Me. 2004)). 
 29. Id. at 155. 
 30. “‘Actual’ means ‘[e]xisting in fact; real[,]’ . . . [a]nd ‘control’ is commonly defined as ‘the 
power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee.’” Id. at 157 (first alteration in orginal) (citations 
omitted) (first quoting Actual, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); and then quoting Control, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY). 
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[the legislature] intended formal legal authority over the child to be a condition 
for standing under subsection (a)(9).”31 To support this determination, the court 
cited Jasek’s holding that actual control is separate and distinguishable from a 
“bare legal right of control.”32 It reasoned that actual control is consistent with 
making the “day-to-day decisions” associated with raising a child, such as “when 
she gets up and goes to bed, how much television she watches, whether she gets 
dessert, [and] when she needs to go to the doctor.”33 Thus, actual control is 
inconsistent with making only the “important” or legal decisions.34 This 
interpretation preserved separate meaning for the term “actual care”—and avoided 
rendering it superfluous—because actual control requires a nonparent to make the 
day-to-day decisions associated with raising a child while actual care requires the 
literal accomplishment of those decisions.35 Although the court acknowledged 
that parents who maintain their parental rights have the legal authority to 
supersede nonparent decisions and permission, it held this merely highlighted the 
difference between actual control and legal control.36 The court ultimately 
determined that “had the Legislature intended to require [legal] authority, it 
would have said so.”37 Therefore, the court held Grandparents had standing 
although Mother and Father remained Heather’s managing conservators.38 
The second issue the court determined was whether the plain meaning of actual 
control required nonparents to have exclusive control of the child. In Smith v. 
Hawkins, a Houston court of appeals found no exclusivity requirement in § 
102.003(a)(9).39 In this case, the Texas Supreme Court cited Smith and similarly 
argued that such a condition on standing “would effectively add an exclusivity 
requirement that is not reflected in the statute’s plain language.”40 It stated that 
focusing the analysis of nonparent standing on the parents’ conduct ignored the 
plain terms of the statute, which do not mention parental conduct.41 The court 
again determined that the legislature would have included a requirement of “total 
‘abdication’ by the parent” had that been the legislature’s intent.42 Accordingly, 
the court held Grandparents had standing even though Mother and Father had 
not relinquished their parental rights and responsibilities and, to the contrary, 
remained actively involved in making decisions about Heather.43 
 
 31. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted in first quotation). 
 32. See id. at 156 (quoting Jasek v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 348 S.W.3d 523, 
535 (Tex. App.—Austin 2011, no pet.)). 
 33. Id. at 158. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 158−59. 
 37. Id. at 157. 
 38. Id. at 161. 
 39. Smith v. Hawkins, No. 01-09-00060-CV, 2010 WL 3718546, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st 
Dist.] Sept. 23, 2010, pet. denied) (mem. op.). 
 40. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 158 (citing Iliff v. Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 80–81 (Tex. 2011)). 
 41. Id. at 159. 
 42. Id. at 158. 
 43. Id. at 160. 
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III.  WHY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT GOT IT WRONG 
The Texas Supreme Court incorrectly concluded that Grandparents had actual 
control—and, therefore, standing to sue.44 By contrast, multiple Texas courts of 
appeals, including the Fort Worth and Beaumont courts of appeals, have held 
that for a nonparent to achieve actual control, the child’s parents must first give 
up actual care, control, and possession.45 These courts reasoned that this 
interpretation of § 102.003(a)(9) comports with the text of the statute and avoids 
potential encroachment on the fundamental rights of parents.46 They rely on the 
notion that, 
so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there 
will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm 
of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best 
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.47 
Therefore, a nonparent cannot have standing unless the parent is unfit or has 
relinquished his or her parental rights.48 In In re M.J.G., the Fort Worth court of 
appeals rejected the grandparents’ claim of standing in a SAPCR because there 
was no evidence that the children’s parents had abdicated their parental rights to 
the grandparents since the parents lived with the children in the grandparents’ 
home.49 The court found that although the children lived with their grandparents 
and the grandparents performed “day-to-day” duties on behalf of the children, this 
was insufficient to establish that the grandparents had “actual care, custody, and 
control” of the children.50 Similarly, in In re K.K.C., the Beaumont court of 
appeals held that a nonparent did not have standing because the parent “lived 
with the child, adequately cared for the child, and did not relinquish to [the 
nonparent] or abdicate her parental rights, duties, and responsibilities.”51 In that 
case, it did not matter that the nonparent spent holidays with the child, 
disciplined the child, attended the child’s school functions, or provided financial 
support for the child.52 These holdings properly reflect the United States Supreme 
Court’s recognition of the fundamental nature of parental rights. 
Furthermore, in the case at issue, Justice Blacklock argued in dissent that the 
court should “adopt the reading [of § 102.003(a)(9)] that avoids burdening 
parents’ unalienable right to raise their children as they see fit.”53 This reading 
mandates that a nonparent cannot have the “actual care, control, and possession” 
 
 44. Id. at 158. 
 45. Id. at 171 n.2 (Blacklock, J., dissenting). 
 46. Id. at 171, 174. 
 47. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68−69 (2000) (plurality opinion) (citing Reno v. Flores, 
507 U.S. 292, 304 (1993)). 
 48. In re H.S., 552 S.W.3d 282, 289 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2016) (mem. op.), rev’d, 550 
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018). 
 49. In re M.J.G., 248 S.W.3d 753, 758–59 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.). 
 50. Id. 
 51. In re K.K.C., 292 S.W.3d 788, 793 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009), abrogated by In re H.S., 550 
S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018). 
 52. Id. at 791. 
 53. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 166 (Blacklock, J., dissenting). 
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required for standing under § 102.003(a)(9) unless the child’s parent has 
relinquished their parental rights.54 Justice Blacklock noted that actual control 
must mean something more than making the day-to-day decisions: “If all . . . 
‘control’ means is deciding ‘when [a child] gets up and goes to bed, how much 
television she watches, whether she gets dessert, [and] when she needs to go the 
doctor,’ then [there is no discernable] distinction between ‘care’ and ‘control,’” 
and the term “control” is thereby superfluous.55 Moreover, Justice Blacklock 
suggested the court erroneously treated actual control and legal control as 
opposites.56 He argued that actual control is fused with the parents’ legal control 
until relinquished.57 Thus, in this case, Justice Blacklock reasoned that 
Grandparents seeking the approval of Mother and Father for Heather’s medical 
care and regularly reporting to them about Heather’s activities “[were] not signs 
of parent-like control. They [were] signs of its absence. They [were] signs that 
control actually lies within the one receiving the reports about the child, not the 
one making them.”58 
The court should have found—for the same reasons Justice Blacklock’s dissent 
and some Texas courts of appeals did—that “[t]he best reading of the text of section 
102.003(a)(9) requires a child’s parents to relinquish or shirk their ‘actual control’ 
of the child before a non-parent may assert the ‘actual control’ required for 
standing.”59 Moreover, the American family is changing: from 1970 through 
2012, the percentage of children living in a grandparent-maintained household 
doubled from 3% to 6%.60 This increase in grandparent coresidence was primarily 
attributed to increasing rates of divorce and teenage pregnancy.61 These realities 
demand an interpretation of § 102.003(a)(9) that requires parents to relinquish 
actual control. Parents should be encouraged to seek out individuals who can help 
provide quality care for their children without fear of compromising their parental 
rights. Such a holding does not diminish the special role nonparents play in the 
lives of children but instead magnifies the critical right parents have to control 
their children’s upbringing, which is one of the oldest “fundamental liberty 
interests recognized by [the United States Supreme Court].”62 Therefore, 
delegating day-to-day care of a child “[should] not reduce the parents’ control over 
the child or [equate to] shar[ing] ‘parent-like’ control with others.”63 
Furthermore, the court’s holding has severe constitutional ramifications. Even 
though the majority argued the constitutionality of its interpretation, when there 
is standing, a judge having “the power to review a parent’s decisions about the 
extent to which non-parents should be involved in a child’s life undermines the 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 172 (first two alterations in original) (quoting id. at 158 (majority opinion)). 
 56. Id. at 170 (Blacklock, J., dissenting). 
 57. Id. at 171. 
 58. Id. at 173. 
 59. Id. at 177. 
 60. RENEE R. ELLIS & TAVIA SIMMONS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CORESIDENT GRANDPARENTS 
AND THEIR GRANDCHILDREN: 2012, at 3 (2014). 
 61. Id. at 3–4. 
 62. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 63. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 170. 
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parents’ role as the ultimate decision-makers for their child.”64 It is clear the 
United States Supreme Court intended to avoid just this: “[T]he Due Process 
Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to 
make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ 
decision could be made.”65 The risk of exposing parents to litigation over the 
parent-child relationship is incredibly detrimental. Such litigation not only 
disempowers parents but also devastates important, often familial relationships.66 
Also, the legal system generally lacks the specialized training to deal with such 
complex and challenging issues, instead relying largely on the vague “best interests 
standard” to determine intimate familial matters.67 For “fit parents, true control 
of their children is an illusion if the courts really get to make the final call.”68 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Texas Supreme Court erred in its holding by broadly interpreting the term 
“actual control,” thereby burdening parents who have not relinquished their 
fundamental parental rights and responsibilities. In a country that has recognized 
the fundamental right of parents to “bring up [their] children” since 1923,69 the 
court should have erred on the side of caution to recognize that it is “cardinal . . 
. that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose 
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can 
neither supply nor hinder.”70 There still exists a fundamental right of parents: 
because they did not relinquish their rights—and, to the contrary, remained 
devoted to Heather—Mother and Father alone deserve the right to ultimately 
make decisions about Heather’s future. 
 
 64. Id. at 177. 
 65. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 72−73. 
 66. Gregory Firestone & Janet Weinstein, In the Best Interests of Children: A Proposal to Transform 
the Adversarial System, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 203, 204 (2004). 
 67. Id. at 206. 
 68. In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d at 177. 
 69. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
 70. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
